Tag Archives: Infrastructure assets

Dunedin’s second generation district plan (2GP) —notes on Natural Hazards

Received from Neil Johnstone
Wed, 3 May 2017 at 7:19 p.m.

Message: Last Thursday (27 April) I presented the remainder of my submission on Natural Hazards. Notes attached in case they might help anybody’s further efforts.

{The notes from Mr Johnstone are public domain by virtue of the consultative 2GP hearing process. -Eds}

****

2GP PRESENTATION NOTES: LANDSLIDES
Neil Johnstone

I have no property interest in any landslide hazard area (although I did previously), nor in the Water of Leith catchment, nor in South Dunedin. My main purpose in appearing at this stage is to bring to the panel’s attention that the expert (so-called) opinions received from Otago Regional Council’s (ORC) natural hazard analysts are often deficient to the detriment of the 2GP process and the city’s residents.

I am a long-term resident of Dunedin and am highly experienced in flood control issues and solutions. I am appearing here on my own behalf, therefore not strictly as an Expert Witness in this instance, although I have done so in past years both in both the High Court and the Environment Court. I also acted as lead technical advisor to the NZ Govt investigation into the massive 1999 Clutha flood. My detailed investigations have ranged from simple issues such as the Water of Leith (as Investigations Engineer at Otago Catchment Board and ORC) to the entire Clutha catchment (in varying roles). These investigations have often incorporated the construction and operation of accurate, properly verified models.

I am now semi-retired MIPENZ, but still running my own consultancy on a reduced basis. I am a highly experienced expert in flood issues, I am much less so wrt landslide identification and mitigation (but I know a nonsensical report when I read one). ORC hazard analysts responsible for the landslide buffer zones originally imposed across my former property (and many others) need to accept that their approach was seriously flawed, and far from expert. Paul Freeland has mentioned to me in a recent phone conversation that Dunedin City Council (DCC) should be able to have confidence that ORC hazard analysts are expert. I have no strong criticism of Mr Freeland, but those days have passed – in this region at least – when expertise was based on proven performance, and not on a position’s title. A property previously owned by my wife and me in Porterfield Street, Macandrew Bay was quite ridiculously misrepresented in ORC’s landslide report of September 2015. The landslide hazard zone on that property has apparently now been removed, but uncaring damage has been done to us, and no doubt to many others. The Hazard 2 zone was reportedly imposed without site inspection, or without anybody properly reviewing output or checking accuracy of references.

[Reason for submitting: Natural Hazards section of 2GP dominated (undermined) by ORC hazards staff input and DCC failure to verify/review; DCC presumption that ORC “experts” do/should have appropriate expertise. We appear to be witnessing a proliferation of Hazard Analysts in NZ Local Government with little relevant experience or skill.]

****

2GP PRESENTATION NOTES: SOUTH DUNEDIN
Neil Johnstone

The comments re South Dunedin flood hazard contained in my original written submission were written prior to DCC’s producing its inaccurate flood reports in respect of the South Dunedin flooding of early June 2015 in which high groundwater levels were held to blame. These DCC reports were eventually released in late November 2015 and April 2016 respectively. My analyses (well after my original submission) demonstrated that the prime cause of widespread flooding in South Dunedin was DCC’s failure (in order of probable significance) to utilise the bypass facility at Tahuna Wastewater Treatment Plant, to fully utilise its stormwater pumping capacity at Portobello Road, and to maintain its stormwater infrastructure (mudtanks etc). Inflow of “foreign” water from the St Clair catchment added to the depth of inundation in some areas. All these can be remedied by a diligent Council. Some have already been remedied, as positively demonstrated in the admittedly rather over-hyped rain event of the subtropical cyclone remnant around this past Easter.

ORC natural hazard analysts were probably responsible for the origin of the groundwater myth as a cause of the South Dunedin flooding in their Coastal Otago Flood Event 3 June 2015 report. Reference was made there to “elevated” ground water levels. They followed up with a contentious report (The Natural Hazards of South Dunedin, July 2016). This opens by stating that the June 2015 flooding was caused by heavy rainfall and high groundwater levels, with no mention of mudtanks, or pumping failures (plural). Such reporting cannot be treated as balanced, nor its authors credible. Elsewhere, ORC essentially conceded the groundwater myth in Rebecca Macfie’s excellent NZ Listener article entitled Flood Fiasco (June 11, 2016).

Shortly after, however, ORC produced the aforementioned South Dunedin Hazards report (backed up by an embarrassingly inaccurate video presentation) that seems to reflect a desire to preach doom rather than convey a balanced defendable scientific analysis of South Dunedin realities and solutions where needed.

One of the worst features of the report and subsequent video was the depiction of projected permanently inundated areas of South Dunedin based on ORC modelling of rising sea level effects. These depictions made front page news in the Otago Daily Times with flow-on reporting nationally. The mapped areas of inundation are actually taken from an earlier ORC report entitled The South Dunedin Coastal Aquifer and Effect of Sea Level Fluctuations (October 2012). The modelling was based on limited information, and the findings would therefore be expected to be of limited reliability. The 2012 report essentially confirms this, noting that modelling of existing conditions overestimates actual groundwater levels (by the order of half a metre in places). Figure 2 (Scenario 0) of that report shows significant permanent ponding for current conditions. None exists in reality. Almost lost (in Section 3.8) are the following (abbreviated, and amongst other) concessions:

• Uncertainty of input data
• Potential inaccuracy of model predictions
• High level of uncertainty
• Groundwater system is poorly to moderately well characterised
• Aquifer properties are poorly understood or quantified
• Each of these uncertainties could have the effect of overestimating the groundwater ponding in the current setting.

The reader is advised to read the full Section 3.8 to ensure contextual accuracy. In my view (as an experienced modeller), a study that cannot even replicate known existing relationships is imperfectly calibrated and unverified. It cannot therefore be relied on. Strictly speaking, it does not qualify as a model. The relationship between possible sea level rise and consequent groundwater impact remains highly uncertain.

Unfortunately, the 2016 ORC South Dunedin Hazards report (and video) chose to reproduce the 2012 ponding predictions using more recent data (but without any better appreciation of aquifer characteristics), but the predictions are similar. It is noted that no Scenario 0 mapping is included in the latter report, nor are the model’s inherent weaknesses described. No admission of the potential modelling inaccuracies is presented other than the following note in Section 4.1: “Further discussion of the original model parameters, model calibration and potential pitfalls is included in the ORC (2012a) report, which can be accessed on the ORC website”. I believe that all parties were entitled to know unequivocally that the modelling was unreliable and unverified.

The 2016 report also makes reference to the fact that dry-weather ground water levels at the Culling Park recorder are at or below mean sea level. This is attributed by the authors to leakage of ground water into the stormwater and wastewater sewers. If that is correct (I would reserve judgement as to whether there may be other factors), then we are witnessing just one example of how an engineered solution could be utilised to dissipate increasing depth of groundwater. Such solutions are canvassed in the BECA report commissioned by DCC several years back.

To summarise, South Dunedin’s exposure to flood (current or future) is poorly described by ORC hazard analysts. The 2GP process seems to have seen these analysts “adopted” by DCC planners as their experts. I consider that to be an inappropriate approach to the detriment of our citizens.

The proposal to require relocatable housing in South Dunedin seems premature, and based on highly questionable information. The proposal for relocatable housing in South Dunedin also rather pre-empts the currently-planned DCC study of overseas approaches to sea level rise solutions.

Requiring relocatable houses will likely simply mean that aged houses that should in time be replaced will be repaired instead. Who is going to build a new relocatable house if they have nowhere to relocate to and probably insufficient money to acquire the requisite land? The proposal to require relocatable housing is ill-considered and premature in my opinion.

With respect to ground water issues across South Dunedin, the 2016 Hazard Report presents –

The reason for my pointing out these facts is to encourage Commissioners to take a step back from the current hysteria surrounding South Dunedin. Had the 2015 flooding extent been restricted (as it should have been) to that which occurred in a slightly larger rainfall event in March 1968, the event would have already been forgotten. Seemingly, at least partly as a result of that hysteria, the proposal to require relocatable housing in South Dunedin seems premature, and based on highly questionable information. Just as ORC floodplain mapping contradicts its in-place flood protection philosophy, so does the proposal for relocatable housing in South Dunedin also rather pre-empt the currently planned DCC study of overseas approaches to sea level rise.

Requiring relocatable houses will simply mean that aged houses that should in time be replaced will be repaired instead. Who is going to build a new relocatable house if they have nowhere to relocate to and probably no money to acquire the requisite land? The proposal for relocatable housing is ill-considered and premature in my opinion.

****

2GP PRESENTATION: URBAN STREAM HAZARDS
Neil Johnstone

Urban Stream Comment re Leith and Lindsay Streams:

ORC’s mapping is said to be of residual flooding (post-flood protection works of the past 80-plus years), but actually represents what might have been envisaged many decades back in something considerably greater than the record 1929 flood with none of the very significant channel works of the 1930s, 1940s and 1960s; or even those lesser improvement of the 2010s in place. The ORC 2GP mapping includes areas that didn’t get flooded in 1923 or 1929. I agree with some potential dangers of stream blockage (especially in Lindsay Creek, and to a lesser extent at Clyde Street and Rockside Road), but one can only consider locations of feasible blockage in today’s conditions. Furthermore, accepted professional practice for flood plain mapping requires detailed hydrology, probability analyses, climate change allowance, hydrograph routing, in-channel modelling (allowing for stream capacity variability), and overland flow modelling. ORC’s flood mapping incorporates none of these fundamentals; instead, it reads as little more than a colouring-in exercise, when a professionally researched technical document is required. In short, ORC’s hazard analysts have carried out no fit-for-purpose analysis for a District Plan process.

Interestingly, the concerns expressed by ORC hazard analysts re channel blockage are entirely inconsistent with ORC’s own design philosophy and consent application evidence for the recent Flood protection scheme (so called). Design Philosophy minimises the issue.

Very briefly, the mapping is challenged for the following reasons (inter alia):

No descriptions of the effective flood protection initiatives (OHB -1920s and 1930s, DCC -1940s, OCB -1960s) are included. These works have ensured that overtopping is practically impossible in the George Street to Cumberland Street reach, the Clock Tower reach and Forth Street to Harbour reaches. Flood protection in these areas are all built to a much higher hydraulic standard than the so-called ORC scheme of the past decade, and to a far, far higher standard than existed pre-1929.

It is further noted that ORC’s own Design Philosophy Report (OPUS for ORC, 2005) for the proposed Leith/Lindsay flood protection scheme is adamant that debris traps recently (then) constructed at Malvern Street and Bethunes Gully would further mitigate any debris problems. Refer paras 7.7 and 10.6 of that document.

Ponding is mapped where water couldn’t even reach in 1929 (peak flood currently estimated at 220 cumecs, and predating flood protection measures) in the wider CBD area. Flows along George Street in the 1920s only occurred south as far as about Howe Street, then re-entered the river. Nowadays, the accelerating weir above George Street and the structural high velocity channel immediately downstream provide much more clearance than existed in 1929. [Most outflow then from the river occurred much further downstream.] In those downstream reaches, many of the bridges have been replaced or upgraded. Possible remaining points of interest are the hydraulically insignificant extension (circa 2015) of the St David Street footbridge, the historic Union Street arch footbridge, and the widened (circa 2012) Clyde Street road bridge. The flimsy St David Street bridge would not survive any hydraulic heading up so there would likely be of little flood consequence, and backing up upstream of Union St would be largely inconsequential because of the height of the Clock Tower reach banks immediately upstream. The Clyde Street bridge is acknowledged as being lower than optimum, but it has not created any issues in its half century existence. Any overtopping there could only impact on a limited area between the bridge and the railway line.

Overland lows beyond (east of) the rail line remain highly improbable because of the ongoing blocking effect of road and rail embankments. Flows as far as the railway station to the west of the rail line are also highly improbable nowadays as only the Clyde Street area could conceivably contribute.

The 1923 photograph showing ponding along Harrow Street is presented by ORC with an unfortunate caption stating that the water is sourced from the Leith. Some undoubtedly was, but the whole of the city was subject to “internal” stormwater flooding from Caversham tunnel, across South Dunedin to the CBD and beyond. To illustrate further, a NIWA April 1923 flood summary (accessible online) provides a summary of some of the information more fully described in technical reports and newspaper accounts, including:

• Portions of Caversham, South Dunedin, St Kilda, the lower portions of central and northern areas of the City and North East Valley were completely inundated.
• Water in South Dunedin was waist deep.
• The Water of Leith rose considerably and burst its banks in many places, causing extensive damage along its banks and flooding low-lying areas.

Today’s stormwater infrastructure is rather more extensive and effective (when maintained), and DCC has a continuing legal obligation to provide to maintain that service.

The levels plotted across Lindsay Creek seem highly pessimistic. Levels are shown to be of the order of 2 metres above North Road in some locations at least. I have [no] knowledge of any such levels ever having been approached. Care must be taken not to include unfloodable areas in the mapping. I don’t however discount localised channel blockage, and the channel capacity is substandard in many areas. The valley slope ensures that overland flow will achieve damaging velocities. Such velocities are noted in the NIWA summary.

Of greater concern to me, however, is that ORC’s mapping appears to have seriously underestimated the significance of potential Woodhaugh flood issues:-

The river channel through here is both steep and confined. The influences of Pine Hill Creek (immediately upstream) and Ross Creek (immediately downstream) add to turbulence and bank attack. The area was ravaged in 1923 and 1929, and there have been evacuations in some much lesser events in later decades. These areas are at considerable risk in a 50- to 100-year plus event. Hardin Street, Malvern Street had houses evacuated in the 1960s flood. High velocity, rock laden flows and mudslides can all be anticipated, and difficult to counter. Area below camping ground / Woodhaugh was overwhelmed in floods of the 1920s – a focus for flooding depth and velocity.

If the 2GP process is to include urban flood maps, these should be diligently derived, based on historical record and appropriate modelling. The mapping should reflect the real flood risks (including likelihood, velocity and depth). The decreasing flood risk from Woodhaugh (potentially high impact) through North East Valley (moderate impact) through to the main urban area south of the Leith waterway (localised and of little-to-zero impact) should be reflected in the mapping.

[ends]

2GP Hearing Topic: Natural Hazards
https://2gp.dunedin.govt.nz/2gp/hearings-schedule/natural-hazards.html

█ For more, enter the terms *johnstone*, *flood* and *south dunedin* in the search box at right.

Related Posts and Comments
6.6.16 Listener June 11-17 2016 : Revisiting distress and mismanagement #SouthDunedinFlood
10.6.16 “Civic administration” reacts to hard hitting Listener article

[DCC Map differs from what was notified]

Posted by Elizabeth Kerr

This post is offered in the public interest.

8 Comments

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Johnstone on ORC report : ‘The Natural Hazards of South Dunedin’ (July 2016)

The Natural Hazards of South Dunedin – July 2016 [read online]
Otago Regional Council
ISBN: 978-0-908324-35-4
Report writers:
Michael Goldsmith, ORC Natural Hazards Manager
Sharon Hornblow, ORC Natural Hazards Analyst
Reviewed by: Gavin Palmer, ORC Director Engineering, Hazards and Science
External review by: David Barrell, Simon Cox, GNS Science, Dunedin

Received from Neil Johnstone
Sun, 29 Aug 2016 at 8:17 p.m.

Message: Misinformation on the causes of the June 2015 South Dunedin flood have abounded since the event. As if the victimised residents haven’t suffered enough from others’ inactions (before and during the event), they are now being subjected to a hazards discovery process whose vigour appears to be exceeded only by its own recklessness. Following are a commentary of the hazards approach adopted by the Otago Regional Council (ORC), and a summary of my investigations into the flood event that I commenced after the publication of Dunedin City Council’s first flood report back in November 2015.

You can download Neil Johnstone’s report or read it below (formatted slightly differently to suit the WordPress template).

█ Download: A REVIEW OF ORC REPORT THE NATURAL HAZARDS OF SOUTH DUNEDIN (1) (PDF, 587 KB)

AN APPRAISAL OF RECENT REPORTING OF SOUTH DUNEDIN HAZARDS

N.P JOHNSTONE, BEng (Civil), MIPENZ

1. Introduction

There is some irony that DCC and ORC should be planning “drop in” sessions for residents in respect of South Dunedin hazard issues during September 2016, some 15 months after the major flood. The prime cause of flooding in June 2015 was DCC’s failure to maintain its infrastructure (not just mudtanks), and its failure to operate its pump stations to their intended capacities. The subsequent spread of misconceptions (i.e. groundwater levels, rainfall significance etc) surrounding the flood causes was at least partly due to inaccurate ORC analyses and reporting.

Repetitive and new doubtful information emanating from ORC via its latest report has been noted. Presentations and an over-simplistic video production have been observed. A footnote covering these observations is included at the end of this appraisal.

Long-delayed DCC reports on causes of the South Dunedin flooding have already been strongly criticised by the author. Specifically discredited are misrepresentations of sea level, groundwater and rainfall ranking. Accepted now by DCC as factors (somewhat grudgingly, and depending on the audience) are mudtank blockage and Portobello Road pump station failures (plural); still to be fully acknowledged are the failures at Musselburgh Pumping Station.

Attention is now turned to significant parts of hazard reports produced by the Otago Regional Council and utilised by DCC.

2. Coastal Otago Flood Event 3 June 2015 (ORC, published October 2015)

This report deals with a wider area than South Dunedin. It is apparent that ORC staff never visited the flooding areas of South Dunedin on 3 June, but took advantage of fine weather to take some water level readings the following day. The opportunity for useful progressive surface water level recording was thus lost. Levels were collected at some 150 points on 4 June. ORC’s main conclusion was that “localised variations in topography were probably the main driver of flood depth”. Or, put another way, water depth was deepest where the ground was lowest. This seems hardly surprising, and even trivial. No attempt was made to explain the photographic images presented of extensive ponding remaining well after the rains had ceased. The phenomena of blocked mudtanks and unutilised pumping capacity went seemingly unnoticed.

The report does usefully reference ORC’s four borehole recorders of groundwater, but makes the somewhat misleading assessment that groundwater levels were “elevated” prior to the rainstorm. This misinformation was seized upon by agencies such as DCC and the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment to highlight climate change impacts.

Having obtained the actual groundwater level data from ORC via the LGOIMA process, the author was able to reveal this “groundwater fallacy” in reviews from February 2016, but it was not until the publication of NZ Listener’s article (June 11-17, 2016) entitled ‘FLOOD FIASCO’ that ORC admitted that pre-flood groundwater levels were in fact “just a little bit above average”. ORC now seems intent on resurrecting this fallacy.

The ORC report fails to address the real and key issues of pumping station failures (Portobello Road and Musselburgh), or comparisons with much lesser flood impacts in the larger rainfall event of March 8/9 1968.

The report states that the 2015 24-hour rainfall was the largest since 1923. This was patently incorrect, but again was utilised by DCC to divert blame from their role in the disaster.

3. The Natural Hazards of South Dunedin (ORC, published July 2016)

The report states unambiguously in its Opening Summary that the major flooding of June 2015 was “a result of heavy rainfall, surface runoff, and a corresponding rise in groundwater”. By now, most people are aware that the causes of the flooding’s disastrous impact were failure to optimally operate pumping stations, failure to clear mudtanks, and failure to deploy staff to key areas during the event. Again, none of these factors is addressed in ORC’s report.

The report presents a table on its second page entitled “Factors Which Can Influence Flood Hazard”. Examples of exaggerated negativity include:

1. Heavy Rainfall:
– Many recorded instances of rainfall leading to surface flooding.
– Heavy rainfall events have occurred frequently over the last decade.

Comment: These conclusions do not appear to be supported by the report’s text, and are vague, factually challengeable and alarmist. Prior to 2015, no major flooding had occurred in South Dunedin since 1968, and even that was minor by comparison.

2. Sea Level:
– Groundwater level fluctuates (by up to 0.5m near the coast) on a twice-daily cycle in response to normal ocean tides.

Comment: All of South Dunedin is near the coast; most of the area does not experience such large fluctuations. This should have been made clear by the inclusion of groundwater data from all 4 ORC sites across the plain, not just from Kennedy Street.

3. Seismic:
– Large earthquakes could result in increased flood hazard on the South Dunedin plain, due to liquefaction-related land subsidence or direct, sudden, changes in land elevation relative to sea level.

Comment: All areas of NZ have some susceptibility to earthquake damage. Dunedin is amongst the areas at lowest risk; no incidences of even minor liquefaction have ever been reported in South Dunedin, and little or no clearly liquefiable materials have been identified (Refer GNS, 2014*). Continue reading

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South Dunedin Action Group: Notes of meeting with DCC (3 May 2016)

Received.
Friday, 6 May 2016 6:02 p.m.

From: Clare Curran [Dunedin South MP]
Subject: Notes from the Meeting with DCC on 3 May
Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 00:31:05 +0000
To:

Dear everyone
Further to my last email here is the notes taken by office from the meeting with the Mayor and senior Council management on 3 May.
This is to keep you informed and for transparency purposes.

A new meeting date will be set up soon and I will keep you all informed

Kind regards

Clare Curran

[begins]

Notes from meeting 3 May 2016
South Dunedin Action Group (SDAG) and mayor + senior management

Mayor Cull
– acknowledged that there was collective concern, that they were pleased to meet with the group and that the meeting provided the best place to provide clarifications
– Acknowledged that the process had been lengthy and frustrating, and “sloppy”
– Council was now very sceptical about evidence relating to the flood and had been let down. He added that they would not make any changes to anything without evidence.
– If the event occurred again even with the proper maintenance there would have been severe flooding
– Determined to make the system we have work the best that it can
– Agreed need another mechanism other than the ODT to communicate with the community
– Will consider the discussion and come back with a proposal for the next meeting with a smaller group

Laura McElhone. Group Manager Water and Waste
– All mudtanks had been cleaned in South Dunedin (marked with green spray)
– Screen has been redesigned at pumping station, work about to go to tender, installation expected July/August
– Screen currently cleaned weekly by contract with photograph for proof
– Proposed screen modifications would see a 4 part screen to allow for safer and easier cleaning – could not confirm bar spacing
– Approx. 100 manholes had been lifted (Oct/Nov 2015) to identify any siltation – none identified as a problem – map can be provided of manholes checked – this exercise will be repeated in Oct/Nov 2016
– Confirmed that with the work carried out or in progress expected reduction in level of water would be about 200mm – however difficult to predict because too many variable to undertake modelling
– On issue of foul sewage infiltration confirmed that work being undertaken in Kaikorai Valley was to reduce the pressure on the system before it came through to Caversham
– On the issue of diverting foul sewage to Green Island treatment works stated that it was only able to handle a certain amount as it had been set up for a different type of sewage
– With regard to pumping out to sea, confirmed that they now know who to contact at the ORC and will maintain valves to enable this to happen if necessary
– Advised Musselburgh pumping capacity cannot run at maximum [this is disputed by Darrel]
– Forecast received on 2 June was for 1/3 less rain – only after midday on 3 June did they receive prediction on the size of the event
– Definitely had contractors and staff monitoring and out in South Dunedin, but did not have enough people to cover the scale of event
– Door-knocking by DCC did not record the number of flooded houses [DCC has not been back to check]
– 1968 flood had two peaks so had time to recover [disputed by Darrel]
– Too many variables to accurately measure topographical data
– Understand need to reassure and quantify but have to be careful not to give false impression
– Advised that 4/5 engineers employed in planning and 6/7 at the delivery end – acknowledged the identified lack of a storm water specialist – currently under recruitment

Ruth Stokes. Infrastructure and Networks General Manager
– Contractors have been asked to verify status of periphery areas
– Need to build resilience in the community – have recognised need to contact secondary schools and community groups and extend beyond the ‘What’s the plan Stan” initiative

Sue Bidrose. Chief Executive
– Unable to provide a figure on the number of roads closed by DCC as the water washed the cones away.
– Civil defence, Fire and Police all advised DCC that only 20-30 houses had been flooded – suggested that volunteers sandbagging were not part of the information loop and therefore message did not get through to emergency services

Kate Wilson. Councillor
– Have been advocating for a rain radar for a number of years on the Taieri

David B-P. Councillor
– Not just South Dunedin affected but other areas also, we need answers to give the community reassurance that the system is operating

[ends]

█ For more enter the term *flood* in the search box at right.

Posted by Elizabeth Kerr

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The complicity of mudtanks and stormwater drains personified

Garrick Tremain – 27 Apr 2016
Garrick Tremain 27 Apr 2016 [screenshot]

Election Year : This post is offered in the public interest. -Eds

The Otago Daily Times has undergone a momentary and unsubtle change this fortnight. The newspaper is allowing near ‘ruthless’ honesty in Letters and Online Comments, including rightful naming and shaming (carefully expressed, within context) of individuals and politicians that should no longer be residing at the local authority. Rush in while the door’s Open —we know it is, for the cartoonist deftly flies his drone again! At our city council. (Was GT threatened from on high prior to Election Year, with blanket censorship too ?).

This sudden rush of print-blood happens belatedly, as debate ensues over the council’s (stadium-ripper) lack of investment and professional engagement with core infrastructure services, city-wide.

Not insignificantly, projects led by “pets” continue under the radar via budget lines in the council’s Long-term Plan (LTP) and associated Annual Plans. Of course, the “pets” feel safe from scrutiny since they’ve built up “such amazing” community rapport and goodwill (a cultural following!). Nope, own castles, own keeps, feathering own nests (*not yours!) —spending money that’s not theirs with weak justification, benefitting minor consortiums of private business (*not the wider swathe of our suburban and rural populations!). Supported handsomely (wink wink) by the odd motley politician who wants “back in”, riding the “pets” like a bar saddle to the next paid trimester. Although…. that gratuitously camp ballet scene at Tuesday’s Infrastructure Services Committee meeting : where the doorstepper was conveniently exposed doing rehearsed Q&A with a scapegoat in a hotseat, was an undoing. The video is coming! Equally, someone else nutted on about the girth of pipes in a soliloquy that will endure many viewings.

While ODT meets the temperature of its audience – at the same time, the council offers little that’s honest, immediate or genuine for the people it has ill-advisedly brought flood, damage and distress to. Surely, the worst-affected should see financial re-dress from this (highly indebted) can’t-pay council. Wethinks fixing, maintaining and upgrading council-owned infrastructure is Not Quite Enough to assuage the greater collective conscience…. There could be, however, real satisfaction seeing the council get the deep cut and tuck, a razor slash. Bringing an ungainly end to bully girls’ vanity and sly defective green-tinged parlour acts that buck off without trimming a balance sheet.

Honing to essentials, the art of cartoon mayhem.

ODT 27.4.16 (page 12)

ODT 27.4.16  Letters to editor Menzies Mathieson Greensmith-West Wallace p12 (1)

Posted by Elizabeth Kerr

[alternative title for post: ‘that’s not mud, it’s dogshit’]

27 Comments

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Mayor Cull won’t admit lack of maintenance #SouthDunedinFlood

Dave famous last words 1a

Mayor calls on government for help
39 Dunedin Television 20.11.15
A rising issue for seaside suburbs, a new report shows Dunedin is most at risk of suffering the negative effects of rising sea levels due to climate change. South Dunedin residents in particular are likely to experience flooding from rising ground water. Ch39 Link

Preparing New Zealand for rising seas: Certainty and Uncertainty
A report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment shows Dunedin is one of the most vulnerable areas in the country.

Related Posts and Comments:
● 3.11.15 South Dunedin Flood | Correspondence… released by DCC #LGOIMA
27.10.15 DCC: South Dunedin flood | higher learning for chief executive
16.8.15 June flood: Dunedin drop-in centre open 27 August
11.8.15 DCC’s unmanaged retreat for South Dunedin
22.7.15 DCC Long Term Plan 2015/16 – 2024/25
18.7.15 DCC Cycleways: SEEING RED, apology NOT accepted
14.7.15 DCC strategies needed like a hole in the head
12.6.15 Fairfax: DCC has no insurance cover for flood-damaged roads
● 5.6.15 WEATHER is not climate change; this is not the 100-year flood
4.6.15 Exchange makeover —or pumps and pipe renewals, um
3.6.15 Civil Defence response to Dunedin FLOODING
10.4.15 DCC: Natural Hazards
28.3.15 DCC Draft Long Term Plan 2015/16 to 2024/25 —Consultation Open
14.10.14 ORC: New strategic plan fosters Otago prosperity
12.9.14 ORC: City bus services, submissions
10.12.13 ORC restructures directorates
18.10.13 DCC: Final vote tally + St Clair boat ramp
18.8.13 South Dunedin and other low lying areas
26.2.13 DCC binge spending alert: Proposed South Dunedin cycle network
30.7.12 ORC on hazard risks and land use controls
7.6.12 Dunedin stormwater: more differences between ORC and DCC
25.11.11 South Dunedin and other flood zones

Posted by Elizabeth Kerr

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South Dunedin Flood | Correspondence & Debriefing Notes released by DCC today #LGOIMA

Downloads:

Kerr, Elizabeth LGOIMA Correspondence Hendry and Williams 2015

Kerr, Elizabeth LGOIMA Flood Debrief Notes 2015

See earlier exchanges (via LGOIMA) and other comments at this post:
█ 30.9.15 DCC liability? South Dunedin Flood (June 2015) #LGOIMA [post removed]

Otago Daily Times Published on Jun 4, 2015
Raw aerial video of Dunedin Flooding
Video courtesy One News.

█ For more, enter the terms *flood* and *south dunedin* in the search box at right.

Posted by Elizabeth Kerr

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Fairfax: DCC has no insurance cover for flood-damaged roads

Funding assistance would be available from New Zealand Transport Agency, with ratepayers set to pay the balance.

### Stuff.co.nz Last updated 14:57 12/06/2015
Insurance won’t cover flood-damaged Dunedin roads
By Hamish McNeilly
Damage to Dunedin’s roading network following last week’s widespread flooding is not covered by insurance, with ratepayers facing a hefty bill for roading repair.
Dunedin City Council Group Chief Financial Officer Grant McKenzie confirmed the cost of roading repairs was not covered by the council’s insurance, because it had become “too expensive” following the Canterbury earthquakes.
Read more

A Givealittle page, Dunedin Flood Appeal, has been set up, while donations to the flood appeal are also being accepted at all Dunedin Westpac branches.

Donations can be made directly to 03 0905 0184000 18 and a street appeal will be held on Friday, 19 June.

Posted by Elizabeth Kerr

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